

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

(Taken from Pres.  
week-end reading  
dtd 11/25)

November 24, 1962

*curva*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I talked to Jack McCloy about his conversation with General Eisenhower and have done the attached memorandum as a result. He was in the country without a stenographer, so I said I would do it. I have sent him a copy and have asked him to make any amendment or correction so that the record will be accurate.

I have also taken the precaution of sending a copy of the draft declaration to John McCone over CIA wires to his retreat in the Caribbean. I do not think he will raise objections, but I do think it is as well to have him signed on. The overtones of McCloy's report suggest that McCone may be in even closer touch with General Eisenhower than I, at least, have supposed.

*McG. B.*  
McG. B.

TOP SECRET attachment

## THE WHITE HOUSE

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November 24, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Declaration on Cuba

I talked to Mr. McCloy about the language of the proposed declaration on Cuba and he agrees to stick with the wording which you approved yesterday on the first round. When we have the first Soviet reaction we can see whether any alteration is desirable.

Mr. McCloy also told me that he had had an entirely satisfactory conversation with General Eisenhower and that General Eisenhower seemed to share McCloy's view that we have a victory in hand and should now wind the matter up promptly. General Eisenhower also agreed that U. S. overflights and intelligence collection were a much better means of reassurance than some undefined UN inspection, and he expressed the view that he had been worried that we might get tied on too hard to this kind of thing. He said that the declaration McCloy was planning to negotiate might meet with some criticism in the country but that he, General Eisenhower, would not only not criticize it, but would support it. He suggested that Mr. McCloy might want to check the proposed language with John McCone, and Mr. McCloy later tried to do so but found that McCone was not available. Mr. McCloy told General Eisenhower that he had the feeling that McCone would not really be satisfied with anything short of an invasion of Cuba. General Eisenhower said that he himself had no such view, but thought McCone might have useful comments.

General Eisenhower did remark that a solution of this kind would still leave us with the Castro problem, but Mr. McCloy and he agreed that nonetheless this seemed the best course available right now. Mr. McCloy reported that General Eisenhower plainly shared his view that a quick wind-up of the immediate negotiations was highly desirable.

Ms. A.

McG., B.

DECLASSIFIED

Fig. 11052. See 3(f) and 5(D) or 5(E).

Stat. NLK-75-92  
By MFD HARS Date 1-9-76